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Background. Functional neurological disorders (FNDs), also known as conversion disorder, are unexplained neuro-
logical symptoms unrelated to a neurological cause. The disorder is common, yet poorly understood. The symptoms
are experienced as involuntary but have similarities to voluntary processes. Here we studied intention awareness in
FND.
Method. A total of 26 FND patients and 25 healthy volunteers participated in this functional magnetic resonance study
using Libet’s clock.
Results. FND is characterized by delayed awareness of the intention to move relative to the movement itself. The report-
ing of intention was more precise, suggesting that these ﬁndings are reliable and unrelated to non-speciﬁc attentional
deﬁcits. That these ﬁndings were more prominent with aberrant positive functional movement symptoms rather than
negative symptoms may be relevant to impairments in timing for an inhibitory veto process. Attention towards intention
relative to movement was associated with lower right inferior parietal cortex activity in FND, a region early in the pro-
cessing of intention. During rest, aberrant functional connectivity was observed with the right inferior parietal cortex and
other motor intention regions.
Conclusions. The results converge with observations of low inferior parietal activity comparing involuntary with vol-
untary movement in FND, emphasizing core deﬁciencies in intention. Heightened precision of this impaired intention is
consistent with Bayesian theories of impaired top-down priors that might inﬂuence the sense of involuntariness. A pri-
mary impairment in voluntary motor intention at an early processing stage might explain clinical observations of slowed
effortful voluntary movement, heightened self-directed attention and underlie functional movements. These ﬁndings fur-
ther suggest novel therapeutic targets.
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Introduction
Functional neurological disorder (FND), or conversion
disorder, refers to neurological symptoms in the absence
of a neurological condition (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). The disorder is common (Carson
et al. 2000) and equally physically debilitating as
Parkinson’s disease, with greater impact on mental
health and quality of life (Anderson et al. 2007;
Voon et al. 2016). Still, it remains poorly understood.
Symptoms are experienced as involuntary but have simi-
lar physiological features as voluntary movements
(Hallett, 2010). An early crucial study hypothesized
that a disturbance of volition might underlie FND
(Spence et al. 2000). Here we focus on the awareness of
motor intention as one aspect of volition, using Libet’s
clock paradigm (Libet et al. 1983).
Libet et al. (1983) reported that awareness of the urge
or intention to move (W judgement) preceded aware-
ness of the movement itself (M judgement) by around
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200 ms. Intention awareness was itself preceded by the
Bereitschaftspotential, i.e. readiness potential, suggesting
an unconscious initiation of the volitional process and
constraining the potential for action control (Libet et al.
1983; Libet, 1999). This has been widely replicated (Lau
et al. 2004; Brass & Haggard, 2007; Fried et al. 2011).
However, Libet emphasized the potential role for
action control and the relevance of the interval
between W and M judgements in the veto hypothesis:
despite unconscious action initiation, action control
would be plausible in that interval, allowing for a
veto or inhibitory process (Libet, 1999; Haggard &
Libet, 2001). Delays in W relative to M judgement
have been reported in Parkinson’s disease (Tabu et al.
2015) and Tourette’s syndrome (Moretto et al. 2011),
suggesting impairments in action control.
The supplementary motor complex (SMC) and infer-
ior parietal cortex (IPC) have been identiﬁed as key
regions underlying motor intention. Epilepsy patients
reported the urge to move when supplementary and
pre-supplementary motor areas (SMA, pre-SMA)
were electrically stimulated (Fried et al. 1991), and
single-neuron recordings showed increased ﬁring as
the W judgement approached (Fried et al. 2011).
Attention to intention with Libet’s clock also activates
the pre-SMA, intraparietal sulcus and dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (dlPFC) (Lau et al. 2004). The IPC has
been suggested to play a role upstream of the SMC
in the development of motor intention with evidence
from electrical stimulation, stroke lesion and motor
imagery studies (Sirigu et al. 2004; Desmurget et al.
2009; Desmurget & Sirigu, 2012).
Converging studies implicate impairments in expli-
cit intentional processes in FND. An early study of
functional paralysis demonstrated impaired dlPFC
activity to attempted movement, which was linked
to a disturbance of volition (Spence et al. 2000).
Functional compared with voluntary tremor has been
associated with right temporoparietal junction (TPJ)/
IPC hypoactivity, a region implicated in sensorimotor
integration (Voon et al. 2010). The authors suggested
a possible impairment of intentional or prediction
processes, as sensory regions were intact. A follow-up
study demonstrated SMA hypoactivity in FND sub-
jects during motor preparation, as well as decreased
dlPFC–SMA connectivity during internally generated
v. externally cued action selection (Voon et al. 2011).
Using Libet’s clock, a small study reported that FND
patients with functional tremor (n = 11) had signiﬁ-
cantly delayed W relative to M judgements compared
with healthy volunteers (HV) (Edwards et al. 2011),
such that the timing of both judgements was in-
distinguishable, implying abnormalities in the con-
scious experience of action underlying functional
movements.
In this experiment, we aimed to explore awareness
of voluntary motor intention in a larger sample of
FND patients with mixed symptoms and HV. We
acquired functional magnetic resonance images
(fMRI) while participants performed the task devised
by Libet et al. (1983). We hypothesized that FND
patients would have delayed motor intention aware-
ness, and lower IPC and SMC activity compared
with HV.
Method
Participants
A total of 26 FND patients and 25 HV took part in the
study, and one FND patient and one HV were later
excluded due to interruption of the experiment during
the scan. FND subjects were referred by neurologists
and psychiatrists from Addenbrooke’s Hospital,
Cambridge, and recruited through the FND Hope
website (http://fndhope.org/). The diagnosis was
based on Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fifth edition (DSM-5) diagnostic criteria
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and either
made or conﬁrmed by a neurologist from the FND
clinic (W.P., M.Z.). Participants were screened by
psychiatrists for psychiatric co-morbidities and to
document symptom severity (S.M., V.V.). FND subjects
with any other major neurological or psychiatric diag-
nosis, including current major depression greater than
moderate severity [Beck Depression Inventory-II
(BDI-II) > 17], psychotic or bipolar disorder and sub-
stance use disorder were excluded from the study.
Current mild depression and elevated depression
scores with no current major depression diagnosis
were allowed. Recruitment was limited by subjects
with head movements, who had ballistic movements,
were unable to remain still in the scanner or had claus-
trophobia. HV were recruited via community adver-
tisements. Participants gave written informed consent
and were reimbursed for their time. All experimental
procedures were approved by the University of
Cambridge Research Ethics Committee.
Participants completed the BDI-II (Beck et al. 1961)
and Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI;
Spielberger et al. 1983). Pain, motor (paralysis or weak-
ness, non-epileptic seizures, tremor, chorea, tics, gait
abnormalities, dystonia, myoclonus) and sensory
(somatosensory, vision, hearing) symptoms were
recorded based on clinical interview by systematic
enquiry, and rating of duration and severity [1 =mild
(limited impact on daily functioning); 2 =moderate
(noticeable impact on daily functioning with restriction
of some activities); 3 = severe (marked impact on daily
functioning with restriction of activity in multiple
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domains); 4 = very severe (impairment in all or virtu-
ally all domains of activity)].
Stimuli and procedure
In the Libet’s clock task (Libet et al. 1983; Lau et al.
2004) participants watched a red ball revolving around
an unnumbered clock face at 2500 ms per cycle
(Fig. 1a). Participants were instructed to press a button
with their left index ﬁnger after a random time interval
after waiting for one cycle. They were asked to act as
spontaneously as possible and in particular to avoid
preselecting a position of the ball to trigger the button
press. If there was no button press within three cycles
the trial was recorded as missed.
The task consisted of two types of trials. In intention
trials, participants were asked to attend to when they
felt the urge to press the button (W judgement). In
movement trials, they were required to attend to
when they actually pressed the button (M judgement).
After the button press, the ball continued moving for
1000–2500 ms (0.4–1 revolution). Then, it appeared on
a random angle on the clock face, and participants
were required to return it to the position it was in
when they ﬁrst felt the urge to press the button, or
actually pressed it, depending on the type of trial.
The ﬁnal position of the red ball was recorded if still
for 2 s or after the 7 s period for responding elapsed.
The inter-trial interval lasted 1–6 s. Average latencies
of the W and M judgements were calculated as the dif-
ferences between the ﬁnal position of the ball and its
position at the time of the recorded button press.
Prior to fMRI data acquisition, participants took part
in a brief practice session of 10 movement followed by
10 intention trials. The fMRI task consisted of four blocks
of 20 trials in the order of movement–intention–
movement–intention. The fMRI experiment lasted
around 18–21 min.
MRI data acquisition
MRI data were acquired with a 3 T Tim Trio scanner
(Siemens, Germany) with a 32-channel head coil at
the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre, University of
Cambridge. Foam pads were used to restrict head
movements. Echo planar imaging (EPI) images were
acquired in an interleaved fashion [repetition time
(TR) = 2.32 s, echo time (TE) = 30 ms, 3 × 3 × 3 mm
voxel size, 0.75 mm gap, ﬂip angle (FA) = 78°, 64 × 64
matrix size, 39 slices]. Images were angled 30° to the
anterior commissure–posterior commissure line in
order to avoid susceptibility signal loss in the orbito-
frontal regions. The T1-weighted structural images
were acquired using a magnetization-prepared rapid
gradient-echo (MPRAGE) sequence [TR = 2.30 s, TE =
2.98 ms, ﬁeld of view (FOV) = 176 × 240 mm2, 1 × 1 × 1
mm3 voxel size, inversion time = 1100 ms].
Resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) data were acquired
after the fMRI task for 10 min with open eyes. A multi-
echo EPI sequence was used with online reconstruction
[TR = 2.47 s, FA = 78°, matrix size 64 × 64, 3.75 mm
in-plane resolution, FOV = 240 mm, 32 oblique slices,
alternating slice acquisition, slice thickness 3.75 mm
with 10% gap, integrated parallel imaging technique
(iPAT) factor 3, bandwidth = 1698 Hz/pixel, TE = 12,
28, 44 and 60 ms].
fMRI data analysis
fMRI data were analysed using SPM8 (http://www.ﬁl.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/; Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging, UK). After slice-timing cor-
rection, a mean image for all functional scans was gen-
erated for each subject, to which individual volumes
were spatially realigned by rigid body transformation.
Unwarping was performed during realignment to cor-
rect for dynamic motion–distortion interaction arte-
facts. Structural images were co-registered with the
mean EPI image, segmented into grey and white mat-
ter, and normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template. Normalization parameters
were then applied to the EPI images for an anatomic-
ally informed normalization. Images were then sub-
sampled to 2 × 2 × 2 mm3 and spatially smoothed with
a 10 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM)
Gaussian ﬁlter. Scan-by-scan head motions exceeding
0.5 mm in the functional volumes were repaired
using Art Repair (Mazaika et al. 2007).
The subject-level statistical analyses were performed
using the general linear model (GLM). The main events
of interest were the 1 s periods prior to the recorded
button press in intention and movement trials.
Missed trials and the 7 s period for responding were
modelled as events of no interest. Vectors containing
the event onsets and durations were convolved with
the canonical haemodynamic response function, and
its temporal and dispersion derivatives. The statistical
parameter estimates were computed separately for
each voxel for all 12 columns in the design matrix.
Movement parameters were also included as regres-
sors of no interest in the GLM in addition to deweight-
ing on the repaired volumes.
Intention v. movement trials were contrasted at the
individual level and subsequently inputted into an
independent-samples t test to compare FND patients
and HV. Whole-brain voxel-wise group comparisons
were performed with a cluster extent threshold of 15
voxels at p < 0.001 (uncorrected), correcting for mul-
tiple comparisons at p < 0.05 assuming an individual-
voxel type I error of p = 0.01 (Slotnick et al. 2003). We
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also conﬁrmed fMRI activations in a priori regions of
interest (ROIs) implicated in Lau et al. (2004), the
pre-SMA, the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and
dlPFC, using small-volume correction as well.
The intention v. movement blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast was also correlated with
the behavioural parameter W–M across all individuals.
rsfMRI data analysis
rsfMRI data were analysed with multi-echo inde-
pendent component analysis (ME-ICAv2.5 beta6;
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov). First, FastICA was used to
decompose multi-echo fMRI data. The BOLD signal
is characterized by TE-dependence, which was
measured using the pseudo-F statistic κ; whereas
TE-independence was measured by the pseudo-F stat-
istic ρ. Components were then categorized as BOLD or
non-BOLD based on their κ- and ρ-value weightings,
respectively (Kundu et al. 2012), and non-BOLD com-
ponents were removed by projection. Denoised EPI
images were co-registered to MPRAGE, normalized
to the MNI template, spatially smoothed with a
6 mm FWHM Gaussian ﬁlter, and temporally band-
pass ﬁltered between 0.008 and 0.09 Hz. Anatomical
scans were segmented into grey matter, white matter
and cerebrospinal ﬂuid (CSF), and signiﬁcant principal
components in white matter and CSF regions were
identiﬁed and removed following the CompCor strat-
egy (Behzadi et al. 2007).
ROI-driven functional connectivity was computed
with the CONN-fMRI Functional Connectivity toolbox
(Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castañón, 2012) for SPM8.
Based on the task-based results, the rsfMRI analysis
was seeded within the right IPC, as deﬁned in the
Automated Anatomical Labelling atlas.
ROI-to-voxel whole-brain connectivity maps were
computed and entered into full factorial GLMs to com-
pare whole-brain connectivity patterns between FND
patients and HV. Whole-brain voxel-wise group com-
parisons were performed with a cluster extent thresh-
old of 15 voxels at p < 0.001 (uncorrected), correcting
for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05 assuming an
individual-voxel type I error of p = 0.01 (Slotnick et al.
2003).
Ethical standards
All procedures contributing to this work comply with
the ethical standards of the relevant national and insti-
tutional committees on human experimentation and
with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, as revised in
2008.
Results
Participants
In all, 25 FND patients and 24 age- and gender-
matched HV completed the study. Participant charac-
teristics are described in Table 1, with FND subjects
displaying signiﬁcantly higher depression and anxiety
scores than controls.
Symptom patterns and severity scores were avail-
able for 24 out of 25 FND patients (Table 1). Of the
patients, 17 reported pain symptoms (headache n =
13, legs n = 3, body n = 5) with a mean duration of
54.5 (S.D. = 64.2) months. Of the patients, 13 had posi-
tive motor symptoms (myoclonic jerks n = 2, tremor
Fig. 1. Libet’s clock task. (a) Schematic representation of the task. The red ball revolved around the unnumbered clock face
for a maximum of three cycles; participants had to make a button press after waiting one cycle. The ball continued moving
for a random interval, after which participants returned the ball to its position when they had felt the urge (W judgement) or
actually pressed the button (M judgement). (b) Estimated times of intention (W judgement), movement (M judgement) and
difference between intention and movement (W-M) relative to the recorded button press for functional neurological disorder
(FND) patients and healthy controls (HV). Values are means, with standard errors represented by the horizontal bars. ++ p =
0.017, * p = 0.009, ** p = 0.001. For a colour ﬁgure, see the online version of the paper.
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n = 7, dystonia n = 3, gait abnormality n = 3), and 20
patients reported negative motor symptoms of weak-
ness (lower extremities n = 7 or upper and lower
extremities, n = 13). Average duration of motor symp-
toms was 53.5 (S.D. = 44.2) months (omission in one
subject). Of the patients, 19 stated sensory symptoms
(loss of sensation, numbness, pins and needles n = 14,
tinnitus n = 3, hearing loss n = 1, double vision n = 3,
blurred vision n = 8, loss of vision n = 2) with a mean
duration of 46.8 (S.D. = 42.6) months (omission in ﬁve
subjects). Other symptoms such as stutter (n = 4), dys-
arthria (n = 8), dysphonia (n = 4), swallowing (n = 8),
memory (n = 10), gastrointestinal (n = 6), genitourinary
(n = 10) and cardiovascular symptoms (n = 10) were
also reported. Most participants had overlapping
symptom proﬁles. For instance, when considering
only positive motor, non-epileptic or weakness symp-
toms, 16 had mixed symptoms, four had only weak-
ness, two had only non-epileptic seizures and two
had only positive symptoms. Of the patients, 12 had
a symptom affecting the left upper limb they were
using to button press. Eight patients had a symptom
affecting the right upper limb that they were using to
indicate W or M with a mouse. All subjects were
watched carefully to ensure that the symptoms did
not interfere with their capacity to perform the experi-
ment. One might also anticipate that the symptom
might similarly affect both W and M which were
contrasted.
Two participants had current depression of mild
severity, 10 additional subjects had a history of depres-
sion, two had panic disorder and two had a history
of obsessive–compulsive disorder. Medication use
included antidepressants (n = 17), pregabalin (n = 5),
gabapentin (n = 1), lamotrigine (n = 2), topiramate
(n = 1) and a synthetic opioid (n = 1).
Behavioural results
Average latencies of the W and M judgements relative
to the recorded button press were calculated for each
individual after excluding outlier trials (> 2 S.D. from
the individual mean). There was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the number of excluded trials in HV and
FND patients (mean 3.7, S.D. = 1.2 v. 4.1, S.D. = 1.1, p =
0.21). Two outlier FND patients (>3 S.D. from mean
across both groups) were excluded from the behav-
ioural data analysis, thus 22 FND patients and 24
HVs were included in behavioural data analysis.
A mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
the factors judgement (W, M) and group (FND, HV)
showed signiﬁcant main effects of group (F1,45 =
16.54, p < 0.001) and judgement (F1,45 = 33.79, p <
0.001), and a signiﬁcant interaction (F1,45 = 4.38, p =
0.042). FND patients showed delayed W [FND −99
(S.D. = 125) ms, 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) −163
to −35 ms; HV −252 (S.D. = 175) ms, 95% CI −315 to
−190 ms] and M [FND −15 (S.D. = 79) ms, 95% CI
−43 to +14 ms; HV −72 (S.D. = 56) ms, 95% CI −100
to −44 ms] judgements compared with HV. The inter-
val between W and M judgements, W–M, was used as
an implicit measure of conscious awareness of vol-
itional intention. An independent-samples t test
demonstrated that FND patients exhibited a signiﬁ-
cantly reduced W–M interval compared with HV
Table 1. Patient characteristics
FNDa HV
n Mean (S.D.) n Mean (S.D.) Statistic df p
Gender, n χ2 = 3.20 1 >0.07
Women 22 17
Men 3 7
Age, years 25 41.6 (12.2) 24 40.7 (15.5) t = 0.23 47 >0.07
BDI-II 23 22.6 (10.8) 20 6.45 (6.1) t = 6.13 35.6 <0.001
STAI 22 45.4 (14.2) 20 37.5 (9.9) t = 2.08 37.6 0.041
Pain 17 2.6 (0.7)
Positive motor symptoms 13 2.1 (0.5)
Negative motor symptoms 20 3.2 (0.8)
Non-epileptic seizures 10 3.0 (1.0)
Sensory symptoms 19 2.0 (0.7)
FND, Functional neurological disorder; HV, healthy volunteers; S.D., standard deviation; df, degrees of freedom; BDI-II,
Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI, Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.
a FND symptom severity scores were available in 24 patients and were rated from 1 (mild) to 4 (very severe).
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[FND −76 (S.D. = 80) ms; HV −180 (S.D. = 180) ms, t32.3 =
2.57, p = 0.015].
Individual standard deviations across trials were
compared which assess the reporting precision of the
W judgement. FND subjects reported the W judgement
(average S.D. = 156 ms) more precisely than HV (aver-
age S.D. = 305 ms, t42.3 =−2.61, p = 0.013), but not the
M judgement (FND average S.D. = 135 ms; HV average
S.D. = 80 ms, t27.9 = 1.95, p = 0.06).
Exploratory one-way ANOVAs were used to com-
pare the W–M measure of FND patients divided as a
function of neurological symptom presentation with
HV, showing signiﬁcant differences for all symptom
categories (Table 2). Post-hoc analyses showed that
FND patients with any kind of motor symptoms had
more reduced W–M intervals than HV. To assess the
speciﬁcity of these ﬁndings we compared those with
only negative motor symptoms, positive symptoms
(with or without negative) and HV. The one-way
ANOVA showed a trend (p = 0.052); the post-hoc ana-
lysis showed that patients with positive motor symp-
toms differed from HV (p = 0.019), but not those with
only negative symptoms (p > 0.2) (Bonferroni correc-
tion p < 0.025). Note that all subjects with positive
symptoms also had negative symptoms. We attempted
to examine laterality for positive motor symptoms but
only three subjects had positive symptoms that did not
affect the hand used in the task. We compared subjects
with bilateral/left-sided weakness [n = 8, −49 (S.D. = 52)
ms] and right-sided weakness [n = 8, −82 (S.D. = 75) ms]
with HV [n = 20, −178 (S.D. = 174) ms], which showed a
trend using a one-way ANOVA (p=0.054).
fMRI results
We excluded two FND patients and two HV from the
analysis due to excessive head movement (>0.5 mm),
where over one-third of volumes needed repairing
with ArtRepair (Mazaika et al. 2007). Data from 23
FND patients and 22 HV were included in the fMRI
analysis; in the comparison between groups, data
were also analysed after excluding the two outlier
patients identiﬁed in the behavioural analysis, and all
fMRI ﬁndings were consistently observed.
Across all participants, attention to intention relative
to attention to movement was associated with
increased activity in the bilateral IPL, dlPFC/inferior
frontal gyrus and pre-SMA/dlPFC, as well as some
minor clusters within temporal and occipital lobes
(Fig. 2a, online Supplementary Table S1).
When comparing intention v. movement trials
between groups, FND patients exhibited signiﬁcantly
reduced activity within the right IPL [supramarginal
gyrus, Brodmann area (BA) 40; peak voxel reported
in MNI coordinates x y z in mm: 54, −32, 42; cluster
size = 36; Z = 3.58] compared with HV (Fig. 2b). The
above-mentioned results were replicated after exclud-
ing the two outlier patients: FND patients showed
signiﬁcantly reduced IPL activity with the same peak
coordinates (cluster size = 43; Z = 3.70) compared with
HV. An additional activation in the left premotor cor-
tex was also revealed (superior frontal gyrus; MNI
coordinates: −18, 6, 50; cluster size = 49; Z = 3.67).
The W–M interval was positively correlated with
BOLD activity in intention v. movement trials in the
bilateral IPL and primary motor/premotor areas, and
left dlPFC and precuneus (Fig. 2c, online Supplemen-
tary Table S2).
rsfMRI results
Data from 25 FND patients and 70 HV [40 women,
40.19 (S.D. = 12.70) years old], including those HV that
took part in the fMRI study, were included in the
rsfMRI analysis. Compared with HV, FND patients
demonstrated reduced connectivity between the right
IPC and frontal control regions [dlPFC, anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), BA 10; Fig. 3b], but increased func-
tional connectivity with the premotor cortex and
SMA (Fig. 3a, online Supplementary Table S3).
Discussion
We show using Libet’s clock task (Libet et al. 1983) that
FND is characterized by impaired awareness of volun-
tary motor intention with delayed W relative to M jud-
gements. The judgement of W was both abnormally
delayed and more precise relative to HV. On an
exploratory basis, this delay in W was particularly evi-
dent in patients with involuntary functional positive
motor symptoms and less so in those with only nega-
tive motor symptoms. Our results concur with a previ-
ous report of abnormalities in the conscious experience
of action in a small sample of 11 patients with psycho-
genic tremor (Edwards et al. 2011), replicating these
ﬁndings in a larger sample. These ﬁndings might
also explain observations of impaired effortful volun-
tary movement in FND (Criswell et al. 2010) and com-
mon observations of enhanced attention towards both
voluntary and involuntary movement. As expected,
across all subjects, the attention to intention v. move-
ment was associated with enhanced activity in the
bilateral IPL, dlPFC and pre-SMA. Crucially, FND sub-
jects had lower activity in the right IPL (BA 40, supra-
marginal gyrus) compared with HV in the contrast of
W–M. This region was also positively correlated with
the behavioural measure W–M across all subjects,
thus emphasizing its role in the conscious awareness
of volitional intention. The network implicated in vol-
untary motor intention also showed aberrant
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functional connectivity at rest in FND subjects. FND
showed reduced resting-state functional connectivity
between the right IPC and prefrontal structures
(dlPFC, ACC, BA 10), regions upstream in the process-
ing of intention and action selection, but increased con-
nectivity with the premotor cortex and SMA, regions
downstream in the processing of intention and motor
preparation. Previous studies in FND have implicated
lower TPJ/IPC activity to involuntary functional
symptoms (Voon et al. 2010) and lower SMA activity
during voluntary motor preparation (Voon et al.
2011). Here we speciﬁcally isolate the awareness of
voluntary intention and build on data implicating an
abnormal fronto-parietal network and suggest that
these ﬁndings might play a role in the subjective
sense of involuntariness.
Our ﬁndings may implicate a general impairment in
inferior parietal function. Previous studies have shown
hypoactivity of the right TPJ in the comparison of invol-
untary and mimicked tremor (Voon et al. 2010). As
neural regions associated with the sensory outcome
appeared to be intact, we had speculated that the pri-
mary deﬁcit might be related to an impairment at the
level of the sensory prediction (Voon et al. 2010). A
follow-up study further showed decreased functional
connectivity of the right TPJ seed using average coordi-
nates from ameta-analysis of self-agency studies (peak x
y z = 51, −46, 31 mm) within BA 39 (Maurer et al. 2016).
The TPJ is a large region encompassing the IPL. The
right IPL activation in the attention to intention v. move-
ment condition across all subjects was very large (cluster
size k = 10 439) and included the right TPJ. However, the
Table 2. W and M judgements as a function of functional symptom typea
Present Absent HV
Symptom n Mean (S.D.) n Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) F (p) Present v. HV: p
Absent v.
HV: p
Positive motor 12 −55 (78) 10 −87 (66) −180 (180) 3.58 (0.037) 0.017 0.100
Negative motor 18 −79 (78) 4 −26 (25) −180 (180) 3.69 (0.033) 0.029 0.051
Positive motor v.
only negative
motor
12 Positive (with/
without negative)
−55 (78)
8 Negative
only
−101 (67)
−180 (180) 3.18 (0.052) Positive (with/
without negative)
0.019
Negative
only
0.211
Non-epileptic
seizures
8 −49 (64) 14 −79 (78) −180 (180) 3.55 (0.037) 0.037 0.040
Somatosensory 13 −81 (63) 9 −53 (85) −180 (180) 3.55 (0.038) 0.054 0.027
Data are given as mean difference between W and M judgements (in ms) (S.D.).
HV, Healthy volunteers; S.D., standard deviation; ANOVA, analysis of variance; df, degrees of freedom.
a F values of the ANOVAs are given, as well as p values of the ANOVAs and Fisher’s least signiﬁcant difference post-hoc
tests. All ANOVAs had dffactor = 2 and dferror = 43, except the ANOVA comparing functional neurological disorder patients
with positive motor symptoms, patients with only negative symptoms and HV, which had dffactor = 2 and dferror = 41.
Fig. 2. Attention to intention v. movement. (a) Signiﬁcant activations associated with attention to intention compared with
attention to movement (intention v. movement contrast) across all participants (n = 45). (b) Regions of signiﬁcantly decreased
activity for functional neurological disorder patients (n = 23) compared with healthy volunteers (n = 22) when attending to
intention compared with attending to movement. Image displayed at p < 0.005 (uncorrected) for illustration. (c) Results of the
correlation between the intention v. movement contrast and the behavioural measure W-M across all participants (n = 45).
Image displayed at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) for illustration. pre-SMA, Pre-supplementary motor area; dmPFC, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; M1, primary
motor cortex.
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right IPL activation (peak x y z = 54, –32, 42 mm) in the
group comparison (FND <HV; Figs 2 and 3) is localized
in the angular/supramarginal gyrus in BA 40 anddistant
from the superior temporal lobule. Both BA 39 and BA
40 are implicated in impairments in intention using
Libet’s clock (Desmurget & Sirigu, 2012). A generalized
impairment in inferior parietal cortical function may be
an issue which has been observed in some but not all
FND studies (for a review, see Voon et al. 2016).
Differences in imaging task design and hence function
might thus highlight different parietal regions. Thus,
although both studies implicate impairments in the
IPC, the focus on intention in voluntary movements
implicates BA 40 whereas differences between the com-
parison of involuntary and voluntary movement might
highlight more comparator systems of sensory predic-
tion and outcome implicating BA 39 or the TPJ.
Mechanistic considerations
There are several possible explanations for our ﬁndings.
Here we discuss plausible mechanisms including the
role of attention, impairments in explicit intentional pro-
cesses, decision thresholds and movement veto.
Attending to and reporting the intention to move
might be more difﬁcult and demanding more attention
than reporting the movement itself, so that subjects
with attentional impairments may have more difﬁculty
in making the W judgement. Non-speciﬁc impairments
in attention have been documented across some but
not all studies in FND (for a review, see Voon et al.
2016). However, in our study, FND patients reported
the W judgement more precisely than HV, thus sug-
gesting that the reduced latency is unlikely to be due
to a non-speciﬁc attentional impairment. We also con-
trolled for non-speciﬁc attention effects by comparing
two conditions that require the allocation of attention
to either intention or movement. An intriguing
follow-up of this study might be to consider how
W–M might present in subjects with malingering in
which the symptoms are deliberately produced. One
might speculate that the variability associated with
reporting of W might be much greater than observed
in FND.
Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest
enhanced directed attention towards self-related repre-
sentations and pathological symptoms (Brown, 2004;
Cojan et al. 2009; Edwards et al. 2012). These ﬁndings
of an enhanced precision (inverse variance) of abnor-
mally delayed voluntary intention converge with
theories of enhanced attention towards and thus preci-
sion of abnormal pathological priors or expectations in
Fig. 3. Resting-state functional connectivity from right inferior parietal cortex (IPC) seed. (a) Increased (functional neurological
disorder patients > healthy volunteers; FND>HV) and (b) decreased (HV > FND) functional connectivity from IPC to whole
brain for FND patients (n = 25) compared with HV (n = 70) during rest. Image displayed at p < 0.005 (uncorrected) for
illustration. SMA, Supplementary motor area; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; MTG, middle
temporal gyrus; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; BA, Brodmann area; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex.
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FND (for a review, see Edwards et al. 2012). Although
enhanced attention to the movement symptom is
observed in FND, what is not clear is whether this is
a primary pathology or possibly a compensatory
mechanism underlying primary impairments in vol-
itional processes. Enhanced attention to both voluntary
and functional movements is observed clinically in
FND (van Poppelen et al. 2011) and attention appears
to play a role in the expression of the symptom as
demonstrated by clinical signs of improvement or ces-
sation of functional symptoms with distractability or
shifts of attention away from the functional movement
(Schwingenschuh & Deuschl, 2016). Attention focused
on a novel voluntary movement is required for optimal
motor function but can impair automatic overlearned
habitual movements. That attention is enhanced to
self in FND might be compensatory and secondarily
related to primary impairments in voluntary motor
intention. The enhanced attention might then also
interfere with skilled automatic movements. That
focused attention increases the functional movement
suggests that the aberrant movement is novel and
goal-oriented in nature rather than automatic and
habitual as otherwise, attention should impair habits
and decrease the functional movement. Our ﬁndings
would be consistent with clinical observations of
increased attention towards both the involuntary and
voluntary movements in FND.
Several lines of evidence suggest impairments in
explicit but not implicit motor processes in FND, sug-
gesting possible impairments in motor conceptualiza-
tion or volition, ﬁrst theorized by Spence et al. (2000)
(for a review, see Voon et al. 2016). FND subjects are
impaired at explicit instructed v. implicit automatic
mental rotation of hands or feet (Roelofs et al. 2001).
In this study, functional paralysis subjects subjectively
reported that they could not explicitly mentally rotate
their hands or feet to match the image in 51% of foot
trials, compared with 0% in controls. Similarly, FND
subjects were impaired in tasks dissociating explicit
pre-planned movements under full control or under
greater certainty but intact in implicit movements
occurring more automatically under contexts in
which subjects may be less aware (e.g. one-back reach-
ing, visuomotor transformation or variable predictive
value of precued reaction time) (Parees et al. 2013).
Focusing on the motor intention phase of movement,
FND subjects also show decreased activity in the
SMA and increased activity in limbic regions (amyg-
dala, anterior insula) relative to healthy controls
(Voon et al. 2011). FND was also associated with
decreased functional connectivity between the dlPFC
and SMA in freely chosen v. directed cued movement,
suggesting a possible impairment in higher-order
action selection during freely chosen actions.
Together these ﬁndings suggest primary impairments
in explicit motor intentional processes with intact
implicit automatic processes. These ﬁndings help
explain observations of impaired voluntary movement
in FND as tested on ﬁnger tapping (Criswell et al. 2010)
and common clinical observations of enhanced atten-
tion and effort directed towards voluntary movement
which may be secondary to the primary impairment.
Indeed, a supportive clinical criterion of functional
movement is slowed effortful voluntary movement
(Schwingenschuh & Deuschl, 2016). The mechanisms
underlying functional movement may also represent
an extension of this impairment in explicit volitional
motor process engaging enhanced attention. The
enhanced attention may also then secondarily interfere
with skilled automatic movements.
These abnormalities in intention awareness appear
to be greater in patients with positive motor
symptoms, although we note that the relationship
with speciﬁc neurological symptoms should be inter-
preted cautiously given the limited sample size.
Nevertheless, several intriguing mechanisms may be
speciﬁcally relevant to positive motor symptoms. It
has been suggested that movements are produced
when a certain decision threshold is crossed and that
the precise moment at which this threshold is crossed
is largely determined by spontaneous subthreshold
ﬂuctuations of neuronal activity (Schurger et al. 2012).
In the context of FND, it could be speculated that
patients might have a lower decision threshold and/
or increased neuronal subthreshold ﬂuctuations,
resulting in an increased likelihood of abnormally
crossing said threshold and thus producing aberrant
movements. Indeed, the Bereitschaftspotential, which
has been posited to reﬂect the increase in spontaneous
neuronal subthreshold ﬂuctuations preceding volun-
tary movements (Schurger et al. 2012), has been
found to precede psychogenic myoclonus (Terada
et al. 1995).
Another possible underlying mechanism could be
related to the interval between awareness of intention
and movement, which has been hypothesized to tem-
porally allow for a conscious inhibition or veto of the
movement (Libet, 1999; Haggard & Libet, 2001), as
well as for an evaluation of whether the selected action
might be optimal to obtain the desired effect (Haggard
& Libet, 2001). A recent study (Schultze-Kraft et al.
2016) reported that initiated movements could be
inhibited if a stop signal occurred up to 200 ms prior
to movement onset, but not if it occurred under that
time. Since the temporal shift of intention awareness
towards the movement in FND patients is well under
200 ms, it could suggest that this results in a decrease
in the time available and likelihood of action inhibition
or movement veto. Still, this remains speculative based
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solely on the data at hand. However, as in the current
study, shortened W–M intervals have been mainly
observed in neurological and neuropsychiatric dis-
orders characterized by positive symptomatology
(Edwards et al. 2011; Moretto et al. 2011; Tabu et al.
2015). These ﬁndings converge with a study of FND
focusing on positive motor symptoms in which the
only cognitive deﬁcit observed across a range of
tasks was impaired response inhibition on a Go/
NoGo task (Voon et al. 2013). Alternatively, the
ﬁndings may also be related to prior experience with
functional movements, which may secondarily result
in impaired reliance on the subjective awareness of
the intention to move.
IPC
Our ﬁndings implicate the IPC, but, contrary to our
hypothesis, not the SMC. Cortical stimulation of the
IPC (BA 39/40) has been associated with subjective
feelings of ‘wanting to move’ a body part, whereas
stimulation of the SMC results in an uncontrollable
‘urge’ to produce a speciﬁc movement (Desmurget
et al. 2009; Desmurget & Sirigu, 2012). This phenom-
enological difference suggests the intentional feelings
evoked in the IPC may lie upstream of the SMC, and
has been hypothesized to reﬂect the role of the IPC
in pure intention (Desmurget et al. 2009). However,
which of these structures is key to voluntary action
remains controversial. Some authors attribute this
role to the pre-SMA, highlighting its involvement in
transforming thoughts into actions (Haggard, 2008),
whereas others emphasize evidence suggesting that
the locus of consciousness might be within posterior
brain regions (Koch et al. 2016). Damage to both fronto-
mesial and IPC regions has been associated with the
alien hand syndrome, in which movements are
expressed outside of volitional control (Scepkowski &
Cronin-Golomb, 2003). In an fMRI study of a patient
with a posterior parietal lesion, alien hand movement
was associated with circumscribed activity of the
contralateral primary motor cortex, which was sug-
gested to arise in the absence of volitional awareness
from the IPC (Assal et al. 2007). Indeed, in patients
with IPC stroke lesions, the latency of the W judge-
ment is shifted towards movement onset as compared
with HV and cerebellar patients (Sirigu et al. 2004).
Together these ﬁndings suggest a role for the IPC at
an early stage of motor intention.
Another possible parallel lies in studies of motor
imagery or internal rehearsal of motor representations.
Recently, a tetraplegic patient was shown to be able to
control posterior parietal activity though motor
imagery (Aﬂalo et al. 2015). Recordings showed that
neurons in this area code both goal and imagined
trajectory of the movements, indicating that this region
encodes motor intention and that its signals could be
used for neuroprosthetic applications (Aﬂalo et al.
2015). Motor imagery implicates similar neural regions
as action execution (Decety et al. 1994; Sirigu et al. 1996)
and has been studied in FND as discussed above. In a
limb rotation task (Roelofs et al. 2001), participants
with functional paralysis showed no difference to HV
when judging whether images of rotated hands and
feet corresponded to the right or left limb. However,
they were slower than HV when explicitly asked to
mentally rotate their own limbs to match the position
of the image, with patients subjectively reporting
impaired motor imagery in that they had difﬁculty
mentally rotating their limbs to match the image
whereas no difﬁculties were reported in controls.
These impairments in explicit motor imagery prior to
and without actual movement led the authors to
emphasize an impairment in intentional processes in
FND (Roelofs et al. 2001).
Limitations and conclusion
The study is not without limitations. Although we spe-
ciﬁcally recruited subjects that were able to remain still
in the MRI environment, it cannot be completely ruled
out that the subjects’ neurological symptoms interfered
with testing and that weakness or functional move-
ments occurred during scanning. However, as these
symptoms may have occurred randomly across the
blocks, the contrast used should effectively cancel
any neural activity from adventitious symptoms.
Larger sample sizes with greater symptom speciﬁcity
would also be helpful in understanding the relation-
ship of this measure with speciﬁc symptoms.
Furthermore, how these ﬁndings might be inﬂuenced
by other symptoms commonly observed in FND
including panic symptoms or other somatoform disor-
ders remains to be established. The majority of our
sample was also on medications, which is commonly
observed in FND cohorts. The use of medications
might interfere with imaging ﬁndings; further studies
in other samples on such chronic medications might
be indicated. Co-morbid symptoms of depression or
anxiety are also very common in FND, and the effect
of depression or anxiety symptoms cannot be ruled
out. When BDI and STAI are added as covariates in
ANOVA in behaviour analysis, signiﬁcant interactions
between conditions (intention or movement) v. BDI or
STAI were observed and the main effect of groups or
conditions was no longer observed. FND is also com-
monly associated with generalized anxiety which
was not assessed in this study.
Despite the main ﬁndings of Libet et al. (1983) hav-
ing been widely replicated (Lau et al. 2004; Edwards
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et al. 2011; Fried et al. 2011), including in the current
study, Libet’s clock task has not been exempt of criti-
cism. The precision and nature of the W judgement
has been called into question, with authors suggesting
that the high attentive demands of the task might
result in an imprecise measurement of the internal pro-
cess (Stamm, 1985), or that the W judgement might
represent a peak of intention (Ringo, 1985), meaning
that the subject’s intention would in reality precede
the reported urge, in contrast to the simultaneity pos-
ited by Libet et al. (1983). Recent studies suggest that
the decision for a movement does not abruptly appear
in a binary manner but is gradually constructed; thus
Libet’s task may involve a cut-off for binary translation
of the continuous preparation of action decision
(Guggisberg & Mottaz, 2013). In addition, that subject-
ive time of intention onset is inﬂuenced by perceptual
information such as sensory feedback (Guggisberg &
Mottaz, 2013; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014). Introspection to
one’s own intention might be also intermittent or
rather retrospectively inferred. Critics thus implied
that the unconscious nature of the movement inten-
tion, as reﬂected by the Bereitschaftspotential preceding
intention awareness, would not be such (Stamm,
1985). Haggard & Libet (2001), however, countered
that even the largest estimates of the prior entry effect,
by which attention affects the judgement of synchrony
of events occurring in different streams, are an order of
magnitude smaller than the 200 ms interval between
Bereitschaftspotential and W judgement posited in the
original work (Libet et al. 1983). Moreover, even
those who questioned the precision or validity of the
absolute W and/or M judgements conceded that their
criticism might not affect the relative distance between
them (Rollman, 1985). The latter is of particular
importance to the current work, as it is this interval
that is postulated to be used by the subject to monitor
the desirability and effect of the action (Libet’s veto)
and whether it is an optimal action plan (Haggard’s
speciﬁcity) (Haggard & Libet, 2001). Therefore, irre-
spective of the conscious nature of the movement, a
reduced veto period would have a higher likelihood
of resulting in maladaptive actions, such as the aber-
rant behaviours observed in our FND patients and
reported by previous researchers (Edwards et al.
2011; Moretto et al. 2011; Tabu et al. 2015).
In conclusion, our ﬁndings build on reports suggest-
ing impairments in motor intention awareness in
FND and speciﬁcally highlight abnormalities of the
early motor processing network focusing on the right
IPL. These ﬁndings might explain common clinical
observations of enhanced attention towards move-
ments in FND and impaired effortful voluntary
movements and provide possible novel targets for
therapeutic intervention that might include
psychological or physiological interventions or
neuromodulation.
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